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I. INTRODUCTION
NEARLY SIX YEARS AGO CONGRESS PASSED THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT (the "Act" or
"SOX"), 1 which has been widely touted as the most sweeping federal securities law
reform in nearly seventy years. The Senate and the House both were anxious to
pursue corporate fraud reform after the collapse and late 2001 bankruptcy of the
Enron Corporation, followed shortly by the accounting fraud at WorldCom, as well
as multi-billion dollar financial frauds at Global Crossing, Adelphia, Xerox and
Tyco, among others.' SOX amends both the civil and the criminal securities laws.
The Act makes sweeping changes to the regulation of the accounting industry and
the reporting requirements of public companies. In addition, SOX significantly
adds to the wide array of tools that the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission" or SEC) has to enforce the securities laws and regulations. This Arti-
cle briefly will set forth the circumstances under which the Act was passed. It then
will outline the substance of SOX. Finally, it will discuss key new enforcement tools
that the Act gives the Commission and how these tools have impacted the Commis-
sion's enforcement program.
Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission.
Counsel to the Director of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibility for any private publication or
statement of any Commission employee or Commissioner. This Article expresses the Authors' views and does
not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the Commissioners, or other members of the staff.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Star. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28
and 29 U.S.C.).
2. David S. Hilzenrath, How Congress Rode a "Storm" to Corporate Reform, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at
Al; see also Final Report of Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://images.chron.com/content/news/photos/03/ll/24/enronreport.pdf;
First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankr. Ct. Exam'r, In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-15533 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/thorn-
burghlstrpt.pdf; RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE
FUTURE OF MCI, INC. (2003), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/
corpgov82603rpt.pdf; Simon Romero & Geraldine Fabrikant, The Rise and Fall of Global Dreams, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2002, § 3, at 1 (describing the tumultuous beginning and end of global telecommunication giant,
Global Crossings, and founder, Gary Winnick).
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The story behind SOX begins with the fraud at Enron Corporation, which led to its
December 2001 filing of what was then the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.'
Prior to its demise, Enron was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, employed
more than 22,000 people, and had claimed revenues of $111 billion in 2000.' For
six consecutive years, from 1995 to 2000, Fortune magazine named Enron
"America's Most Innovative Company."' At the end of 2001, it was revealed that
Enron's reported financial condition was no more than fraudulent accounting.6
The Enron fraud resulted in the loss of billions in investor dollars, as well as the
complete loss of thousands of employee pensions.7 It was in this environment that
Congress began deliberating two separate bills, which ultimately became the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.'
The first bill, the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act of 2002, was introduced in the Senate after the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs ("Banking Committee") held a series of hearings from
February 12 to March 21, 2002.' Five former Chairmen of the Commission, then-
Chairman Harvey Pitt, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, and
Chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board, Sir David Tweedie,
among others, testified at these hearings.'" On June 25, 2002, after a series of mark-
3. PETER C. FUSARO & Ross M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON: EVERYONE'S GUIDE TO THE
LARGEST BANKRUPTCY IN U.S. HISTORY (2002) (chronicling the 16-year rise of one of the world's leading
powerhouses and innovators in energy brokering, to its eventual collapse in what was then the single largest
bankruptcy in the history of the United States).
4. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GuYs IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2004).
5. ENRON AND BEYOND: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SECURI-
TIES ISSUES 8 (Julia K. Brazelton & Janice L. Ammons eds., CCH 2002); see also Bethany McLean & Peter
Elkind, The Guiltiest Guys in the Room, FORTUNE, July 5, 2006, at 26.
6. Enron emerged from bankruptcy in July 2004 and on September 7, 2006, the company sold its last
remaining business, Prisma Energy International, Inc. Today, Enron only exists as an asset-less shell corpora-
tion. See Enron Emerges From Bankruptcy, Follows Indictment Of30 Former Execs In Accounting Scandal, CB-
SNEWS.COM, July 15, 2004, http://election.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/05/nationalmain634316.shtml; Press
Release, Enron Creditor Recovery Corp., Enron Announces Completed Sale of Prisma Energy International Inc.
(Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://141.150.158.82/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=94&
Itemid=34. See generally Enron Will Emerge from Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at C9.
7. Barrie McKenna, Executive's Death Darkens Enron Affair, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 26, 2002, at Al; Richard
T. Pienciak, Pensions Big Enron Losers: Bad Timing and Greed Cited as $1.3B is Erased Nationwide, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 20, 2002, at 6.
8. The Act's namesakes, Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael Oxley both retired from Con-
gress, effective January 3, 2007. Greg Farrell, The Men Behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, USA TODAY, July 30,
2007, at B6.
9. See Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies Over-
sight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 14-96, 1065-1103
(2002) (statements of former SEC Chairmen: Arthur Levitt, Richard C. Breeden, David S. Ruder, Harold M.
Williams, and Roderick M. Hills; and then-current SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt).
10. Id.; see also Roberto Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1545 n.64 (2005) (noting that the Law Library of Congress has identified more than forty
Enron-related hearings held by ten different House and Senate committees from December 2001 to February
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ups and amendments in Committee, Senator Paul Sarbanes, then-Chairman of the
Banking Committee, introduced the bill to the full Senate as original bill S. 2673."
The bill was debated on the floor of the Senate from July 8 through July 15, 2002,
when it was passed, as amended, by a vote of 97-0.2
Shortly after the Senate Committee on Banking began its Enron-related hearings,
the House Committee on Financial Services ("Financial Services Committee") com-
menced its own hearings on increased oversight of the accounting industry in gen-
eral. On February 14, 2002, then-Chairman of the Financial Services Committee,
Representative Michael Oxley, introduced H.R. 3763, the Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002.13 After a series of
hearings in March and April, Oxley's bill emerged from the Financial Services
Committee and was passed by the full House on April 24, 2002 by a vote of 334 to
90.14
On June 25, 2002, while the bills introduced by Senator Sarbanes and Represen-
tative Oxley were percolating through their respective channels, news broke that an
internal audit at WorldCom had uncovered a multi-billion dollar accounting fraud
involving underreporting of expenses and inflation of revenues concealed by bogus
accounting entries." The Commission launched a formal investigation the same
day and took the extraordinary action of filing a complaint against WorldCom in
federal district court just one day later, on June 26, 2002.6
While there were substantial differences between the House and Senate reform
bills, the heightened public pressure after news of the WorldCom scandal broke led
to a prompt and short conference that resulted in a single bill. The consolidated
legislation was passed by the full House and the full Senate by a vote of 423-3 and
99-0, respectively. 7 President George W. Bush signed H.R. 3763, commonly
2003); Library of Congress, Enron Hearings, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/federal/enronhrgs.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2008) (detailing the House and Senate Committee hearings on Enron).
11. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 2673, 107th Cong. 1
(2002).
12. 148 CONG. REc. S6734 (July 15, 2002) (vote).
13. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
14. 148 CONG. REC. H1544 (Apr. 24, 2002) (vote).
15. By the end of 2003, it was estimated that WorldCom's total assets had been inflated by approximately
$11 billion. Press Release, Rep. Jo Bonner, R-AIa., United States House of Representatives, Pension Protection
Act Passes Congress (Aug. 7, 2006); see also First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankr. Ct. Exam'r, In re
WorldCom, Inc., et al., No. 02-15533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/
news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/worldcom/thornburgh lstrpt.pdf.
16. Complaint, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2002), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complrl7588.htm. WorldCom settled with the Commission the following
year. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (approving the settlement of the monetary
penalty phase of the WorldCom litigation).
17. The final bill passed by the full Congress incorporated virtually all of the provisions of the Senate bill
and much of the House bill. U.S. SENATE ROLL CALL VOTES 107TH CONGRESS - 2NDSESSION ON THE H.R. 3763
Conference Report, available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/roll-call-vote cfm.cfm?
congress= 107&session=2&vote=00192.
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known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, into law on July 30, 2002, with varying effective
dates beginning on the date of enactment."
III. SOX OVERVIEW
Before turning to the new enforcement tools granted to the Commission by the
Act, it is worth providing a broad overview of SOX. The Act is divided into eleven
titles, the most significant of which are summarized in this section.
A. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Title I of SOX establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB or "Board"), which, under the Commission's oversight," is charged with
setting auditing standards to be used by registered public accounting firms in the
preparation of audit reports" and with periodically inspecting all registered audit
firms." The Act prohibits accounting firms that are not registered with the Board
from preparing or issuing audit reports on U.S. public companies.2 Notably, SOX
makes foreign public accounting firms that prepare audit reports with respect to
any U.S. issuer subject to the Act in the same manner and to the same extent as U.S.
public accounting firms, unless specifically exempted by the Commission or
Board.23 Additionally, foreign registrants are deemed to have consented to proce-
dures for the Commission and the Board to obtain their audit work papers. 4 SOX
requires auditors to maintain all audit or review work papers for seven years from
18. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
19. The Commission's general oversight of the Board includes, among other things, the power and duty to
approve Board rules and to review Board disciplinary and other actions. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 107, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7217 (2006). The Board is structured as a private-sector, non-profit organization.
20. Id. § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213.
21. Section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically requires the Board to inspect annually all registered
public accounting firms that provide audit reports for more than 100 issuers for compliance with the Act, the
rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission, and professional standards. Id. § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 7214. The
Act requires inspection at least tri-annually for all firms that provide audit reports for fewer issuers. Id.
22. Id. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 7212. On September 13, 2007, the Commission filed thirty-nine administrative
actions charging sixty-nine audit firms and partners for issuing audit reports on the financial statements of
public companies while the firms were not registered with the PCAOB. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 69
Audit Firms and Partners for Issuing Audit Reports While Not Registered with the PCAOB, SEC Release No.
2007-183 (Sept. 13, 2007).
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 7216; see also Registration System for Public Accounting Firms,
PCAOB Release No. 2003-007, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 001 (May 6, 2003), available at http://
www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket-001/index.aspx; PCAOB Rulemaking: Order Approving Proposed Rules Relat-
ing to Registration System, Exchange Act Release No. 48,180, PCAOB File No. 2003-03 (July 16, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/34-48180.htm.
24. Foreign audit work papers traditionally have been beyond the reach of the Commission unless they
were produced by a U.S. issuer. For an in-depth discussion of the potential significance of sections 105 and 106,
see David M. Stuart & Charles F. Wright, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Advancing the SEC's Ability to Obtain Foreign
Audit Documentation in Accounting Fraud Investigations, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 749.
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the end of the fiscal period in which an audit or review is concluded. 5 one thou-
sand, eight-hundred, forty-six accounting firms currently are registered with the
Board.26
The Board also has the authority to conduct investigations and impose discipli-
nary or remedial sanctions upon registered public accounting firms and their asso-
ciated persons if they violate the Act, the rules of the Board, or other provisions of
the securities laws related to preparing and issuing audit reports. 7 The Board has
brought sixteen disciplinary actions against more than two-dozen auditing firms
and/or accountants. 8
B. Auditor Independence
Title II of SOX adds new substantive and procedural requirements that enhance
auditor independence. The Act specifies eight categories of services that an auditor
may not provide to an audit client contemporaneously with the audit: (1) book-
keeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements
of the issuer; (2) financial information systems design and implementation; (3)
appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports;
(4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) management
functions or human resources; (7) broker, dealer, investment adviser, or investment
banking services; and (8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit.29
25. As originally promulgated, section 802 of Sarbanes-Oxley required auditors to retain work papers for
five years. 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1). On January 23, 2003, the Commission adopted rules extending the mini-
mum document retention period for all audit or review work papers to seven years following the conclusion of
the audit. See Retention of Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews, Securities Act Release No. 8,180, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,241, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,911, 68 Fed. Reg. 4862-01 (Jan. 30, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 210) (adopting Rule 2-06 of Regulation S-X to implement section 802 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002).
26. See PCAOB Registration Page, http://www.pcaob.org/Registration/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 27,
2008). Current registrants are located in eighty-three countries, forty-eight U.S. states, Guam and Puerto Rico.
Id.
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 7215. The constitutionality of the Board's inspection and disci-
plinary powers was challenged recently by two auditors who were the subject of an ongoing Board investigation
and non-profit trade association, the Free Enterprise Fund. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, No. 06-0217, 2007 WL
891675 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected petition-
ers' challenge and granted summary judgment for the Board in March 2007. Id. at *6.
28. For a complete listing of Board disciplinary actions, see http:/www.pcaob.org. In December 2007, the
Board brought its first disciplinary action against a major auditing firm when it instituted proceedings against
Deloitte & Touche LLP for failing to remove an engagement partner from a failed audit of Ligand Pharmaceuti-
cals after the firm's management became aware of facts and circumstances that raised serious questions about
the engagement partner's competence and proficiency as an auditor. In re Deloitte & Touche LLP, PCAOB
Release No. 105-2007-005 (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.pcaob.org/Enforcement/Disciplinary-Pro-
ceedings/2007/12- 10_Deloitte.pdf.
29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g)(1)-(8). The Board has brought three disciplinary
actions for violations of the independence standards. See In re Kantor, Geisler & Oppenheimer, P.A., Steven M.
Kantor, CPA, and Thomas E. Sewell, PCAOB Release No. 105-2007-009 (Dec. 14, 2007) (revoking the registra-
tion of public accounting firm and barring two of its partners from being associated with a registered public
accounting firm); In re Susan E. Birkert, PCAOB Release No. 105-2007-003 (Nov. 14, 2007) (barring an audit
engagement team member from being associated with a registered public accounting firm); In re Kenny H. Lee
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C. Corporate Responsibility
Title III of the Act addresses the responsibilities of audit committees and senior
management. Section 301 requires all audit committee members to be independent
of the issuer." It further requires audit committees to have complaint procedures in
place to address allegations of corporate wrongdoing and gives audit committees
the authority to engage advisers.
Section 302 requires both the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial
officer (CFO) to certify in each quarterly and annual report that they have reviewed
the filing and to the best of their knowledge it is complete and accurate and inter-
nal accounting controls are effective.32 Section 304 requires CEOs and CFOs to
reimburse their companies for all bonuses and other equity-based compensation
received within twelve months of materially noncompliant financial statements that
are subsequently restated as a result of misconduct.3
Audit committees now must establish whistleblower procedures that allow em-
ployees to report anonymously concerns about questionable accounting or audit-
ing.34 Corporate attorneys now have an affirmative duty to report any "evidence of
a material violation" of the securities laws to the chief legal officer or the CEO, and
ultimately to the audit committee if there is not an appropriate response."
Section 308 of the Act gives the Commission the authority to add civil monetary
penalties, which previously were returned to the U.S. Treasury, to disgorgement
funds to be distributed to harmed investors.36
CPA Group, Inc., and Kwang Ho Lee, CPA, PCAOB Release No. 2005-022, PCAOB No. 105-2005-004 (Nov. 22,
2005) (revoking registration of accounting firm and barring its sole CPA shareholder from being associated
with a registered public accounting firm).
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
33. Id. § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243.
34. Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4). Committees also must have procedures for reviewing and retaining
any such reports. A common response to this requirement has been for audit committees to contract with
independent hotline companies to receive the reports. Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1757 (2007) (citing Jennifer Bjorhus, Hot Lines Hot: Watchdog Law Has Companies Scrambling to
Line Up Off-site Services to Record Anonymous Employee Comments, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 12, 2004, at
DI).
35. Section 307 of the Act requires the Commission, within six months of the passage of the Act, to issue a
rule that obligates attorneys to report evidence of material violations up the ladder. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307,
15 U.S.C. § 7245. The Commission implemented such a rule on January 29, 2003. Implementation of Stan-
dards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8,185, Exchange Act Release No.
47,276, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,919 (Jan. 29, 2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2003)). The
idea that corporate lawyers have some obligation to report fraud all the way up the internal ladder is not
entirely new. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002).
36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246.
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D. Enhanced Financial Disclosures
Title IV of the Act requires the Commission to prescribe rules to enhance financial
disclosures in periodic reports and to require management to make and report on
an assessment of internal controls on an annual basis.3" These disclosures must be"on a rapid and current basis" 8 and "in plain English."39 Additionally, issuers are
required to disclose in their annual report whether their audit committee contains
at least one "financial expert."40
E. Corporate Fraud Accountability: Enhanced Criminal and Civil Remedies
Titles VIII, IX and XI of the Act add substantive criminal provisions to the securi-
ties laws and enhance the maximum criminal penalties that can be imposed on
violators." For individuals, SOX extended the maximum jail terms for securities
violations from ten to twenty years and increased the maximum fines from $1
million to $5 million.42 For corporations, SOX increased the maximum fine from
$2.5 million to $25 million.43 In addition to increased penalties for existing viola-
tions, SOX creates a new federal felony for securities fraud and two new criminal
anti-shredding penalties."
SOX prohibits issuers from discharging or otherwise retaliating against employ-
ees who report securities law violations or participate in an investigation or pro-
ceeding related to alleged violations.45 Prior to SOX, private sector retaliation suits
generally were governed by state law. The whistleblower protection provisions of
37. Id. §§ 401, 404, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 7262; see also Management's Reports on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release
No. 8,238, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068 (June 5, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274); Disclosure in Management's Discussion and
Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release
No. 8,182, Exchange Act Release No. 47,264 (Jan. 28, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249).
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 409, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(I).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265. A designated audit committee financial expert must have an understand-
ing of GAAP; either actual experience in preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial statements of a
complexity similar to that expected to be raised by the company's actual financial statements, or experience
actively supervising persons with such experience; an understanding of internal controls for financial report-
ing; and an understanding of audit committee duties and obligations. Id. Commission rules also require that if
the requisite attributes are not obtained by certain specified formal education and/or specified experiences, the
issuer is required to disclose specifically what qualifies the individual as a "financial expert." Disclosure Re-
quired by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8,177A, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,235A (Mar. 31, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249).
41. See generally Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 321, 334-43 (2007) (providing a thorough review of
SOX's criminal law provisions).
42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1106, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1519-20 (2000).
45. Id. § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
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SOX create a federal securities law cause of action for acts of employer retaliation.46
In addition, SOX gives the Department of Justice jurisdiction to impose criminal
penalties on companies or individuals that knowingly and willfully retaliate against
whistleblowers.47
Section 1105 gives the Commission authority to seek officer and director bars in
an administrative hearing, without petitioning a federal court.4" The Act also
reduces the standard to obtain an officer and director bar from "substantially unfit"
to "unfit."49
IV. NEW ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
In addition to the prophylactic provisions of SOX intended to increase the accuracy
of audits and financial disclosure, SOX adds to the array of enforcement tools the
Commission has within its authority. Key among these new tools are extraordinary
payment freezes, clawbacks of executive compensation in the event of a restatement
for "material noncompliance," fair funds, executive certifications of financial state-
ments, and enhanced remedies.5" The remainder of this Article will address these
various new tools.
A. Extraordinary Payment Freezes
Section 1103 of SOX authorizes the Commission to seek a temporary order freezing"extraordinary payments" by a publicly-traded company to its "directors, officers,
partners, controlling persons, agents or employees," while the company is under a
lawful Commission investigation."' Section 1103 is intended to stop the corpora-
tion from inappropriately compensating individuals who participated in fraudulent
conduct 2 and to preserve assets that potentially can be returned to harmed inves-
46. Id. § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). Before filing a civil action under section 806, an employee must file a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who then refers it to the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion for investigation. Id. § 806(b), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). A Department of Labor administrative law judge
hears the evidence resulting from the investigation and renders a decision. 14 Guy P. LANDER, U.S. SECURITIES
LAW FOR FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 6:168 (2d ed. 2007).
47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513.
48. Id. § 1105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-3, 77h-1.
49. Id. § 305, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 1103, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i). Section 1103 provides in relevant part:
Whenever, during the course of a lawful investigation involving possible violations of the Federal
securities laws by an issuer of publicly traded securities or any of its directors, officers, partners,
controlling persons, agents, or employees, it shall appear to the Commission that it is likely that the
issuer will make extraordinary payments (whether compensation or otherwise) to any of the forego-
ing persons, the Commission may petition a Federal district court for a temporary order requiring
the issuer to escrow, subject to court supervision, those payments in an interest-bearing account for
45 days.
Id.
52. See George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address on Corporate Responsibility (July 9,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709-4.html (calling upon Congress
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tors. 3 If granted, a section 1103 freeze is valid for forty-five days. 4 If the Commis-
sion charges an executive subject to a section 1103 freeze before the freeze expires,
the freeze remains in effect until the conclusion of the litigation.55
The Commission has had the authority to seek temporary restraining orders,
asset freezes and injunctions (permanent and preliminary) since its inception. 6
What makes section 1103 distinct is that it gives the Commission authority to seek
a temporary freeze before the Commission files an action. 7 The Act does not set
forth any specific factual showing that the Commission is required to make in
order to obtain a section 1103 order. 8 Rather, the statute states that the Commis-
sion must demonstrate that it is conducting a "lawful investigation" of potential
securities violations by a publicly-traded company or any of its officers, directors,
or employees, and that it appears "likely" that the "extraordinary payment" will be
made. 9 The Act is also silent as to what constitutes an "extraordinary payment."
To date, the Commission has sought to freeze extraordinary payments to the
executives of three companies: HealthSouth Corporation ("HealthSouth"), Vivendi
Universal ("Vivendi") and Gemstar-TV Guide International ("Gemstar").
"to strengthen the ability of SEC investigators to temporarily freeze improper payments to corporate execu-
tives"); 148 CONG. REc. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002) (Representative Sensenbrenner stating that section 1103
authority will prevent "top executives [from] pilfer[ing] the assets of the company by giving themselves huge
bonuses and other extraordinary payments if the company is subject to an SEC investigation."); 148 CONG.
REc. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (Senator Trent Lott stating that section 1103 would "ensur[e] that corpo-
rate assets are not improperly taken [for] an executive's personal benefit.").
53. The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 43-61
(Apr. 21, 2005) (statement of William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman) (describing section 1103 as one of the
"[t]wo ... most powerful tools that the Act gave the Commission"); see also SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l,
Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Faced with one cataclysmic corporate accounting scandal after
another . . . Congress' purpose in enacting Section 1103's escrow measure could not be clearer. . . . [T]he
intent of Congress ... was to provide a strong shield for third-party creditors and corporate investors once the
SEC begins an investigation of corporate malfeasance."); Brief of the SEC, Appellee at 35, SEC v. Gemstar-TV
Guide Int'l, Inc., No. 03-56129 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2003) ("Section 1103 is a prophylactic provision, which seeks
to preserve corporate assets during a Commission investigation and subsequent enforcement action.").
54. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1103(a)(3)(A)(i)-(iv), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i)-(iv). If the Commission has
not filed charges at the end of the initial freeze period, it can petition the court for a single forty-five-day
extension. Id.
55. Id. § 1103(a)(3)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3)(B)(iii). If the executive is not charged within the statu-
tory period, or judicial extension thereof, the freeze expires. Id. § 1103(a)(3)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
3(c)(3)(B)(ii).
56. See, e.g., Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t; Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (provid-
ing the SEC with permanent injunction authority); Securities Act § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a); Exchange Act
§ 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (conferring general equity powers upon the district courts, which has been held to
include the temporary freezing of one's assets); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir.
1972); Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat.
931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing the SEC with the power to issue
temporary and permanent cease-and-desist orders). For an in-depth overview of these various SEC enforce-
ment remedies existing prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, see Wesley Bowen Gilchrist, Comment,
Turning Up the Heat: The SEC's New Temporary Freeze Authority, 56 ALA. L. REV. 873 (2005).
57. Gilchrist, supra note 56, at 880-82.
58. Id. at 882-83.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i).
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1. HealthSouth
On March 19, 2003, during the course of a financial fraud investigation involving
HealthSouth, the Commission sought a section 1103 order requiring HealthSouth"to escrow ... all extraordinary payments (whether compensation or otherwise) to
any director, officer, partner, controlling person, agent, or employee."6 ° The Com-
mission's request was filed as part of a complaint that also sought injunctive relief,
disgorgement and civil penalties against both HealthSouth and its CEO, Richard
Scrushy, as well as an officer and director bar and asset freeze against Scrushy.
Notably, the Commission did not identify any particular payments that it believed
would be made improperly absent the freeze. Rather, the Commission pleadings
stated:
Scrushy remains in control of [HealthSouth] and continues to have the ability
to direct extraordinary payments to himself and others who may have partici-
pated in the violations alleged in the complaint. [HealthSouth] is likely to
make extraordinary payments, as it has in years past, as its financial results for
fiscal year 2002 are finalized."
The district court entered the section 1103 payment freeze (with the consent of
HealthSouth). 2 The freeze was dissolved after HealthSouth removed Scrushy from
his positions as Chairman of the Board and CEO. 3
2. Gemstar
In May 2003, during a financial fraud investigation of Gemstar, the Commission
sought a section 1103 freeze of severance payments to the former CEO and CFO of
Gemstar 4 The Commission's investigation of Gemstar began a year earlier, in
April 2002, when Gemstar filed its Annual Report and Form 10-K for the year
2001. The filing revealed that Gemstar had overstated its revenue by more than
$107 million. The following day Gemstar's stock plummeted 37%.66 Four months
later, on August 14, 2002, Gemstar issued a Form 8-K announcing that it would
60. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, SEC v. HealthSouth Corp. & Richard M. Scrushy, Civil
Action No. CV-03-J-0615-S, Prayer for relief at f VI (N.D. Ala. Mar. 19, 2003).
61. Commission's Certificate Pursuant to Rule 65(b), SEC v. HealthSouth, Civil Action No CV-03-J-0615-
S (N.D. Ala. May 7, 2003).
62. Press Release, SEC, Commission Obtains Emergency Relief Requiring HealthSouth to Place in Escrow
All Extraordinary Payments to Officers, Directors and Employees, SEC Release No. 2003-38 (Mar. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-38.htm.
63. SEC v. HealthSouth, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
64. Court Orders Escrow of Extraordinary Payments by Gemstar-TV Guide International Under The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Litigation Release No. 18135 (May 13, 2003); SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. (Gem-
star 1), 367 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004).
65. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. (Gemstar II), 401 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
66. Id.
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restate its 2001 financial results.67 In conjunction with the Form 8-K, both CEO
Henry Yuen and CFO Elsie Leung submitted signed sworn statements that they
were unable to certify the accuracy of Gemstar's financials.68
On September 25, 2002, Gemstar announced that it was unable to file its Form
10-Q for the quarter ending June 30, 2002 and was subject to delisting because of
an unresolved dispute with its independent auditor.69 Less than two weeks later, on
October 8, 2002, Gemstar announced that Yuen and Leung agreed to resign from
their respective positions as CEO and CFO in exchange for combined cash "restruc-
turing payments" totaling nearly $38 million, plus additional stock and stock op-
tion compensation.7" At the request of the Commission staff, Gemstar voluntarily
placed the "restructuring payments" into escrow for six months.7
On May 5, 2003, days before Gemstar's voluntary six-month payment delay ex-
pired, the Commission petitioned the district court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia to temporarily freeze the cash payments to Yuen and Leung pursuant to
section 1103.72 Gemstar did not oppose the freeze application. However, both Yuen
and Leung intervened to oppose the freeze, arguing that the phrase "extraordinary
payments" was unconstitutionally vague and in the alternative, the specific "re-
structuring payments" at issue in the freeze application were not "extraordinary."73
Yuen and Leung argued that the payments were neither extraordinary when com-
pared to their own outstanding compensation and termination agreements nor
when compared to compensation and termination agreements of top executives of
other public companies.74 The district court disagreed with Yuen and Leung and
ordered Gemstar to escrow the payments.7 " The court found that the payments
were "extraordinary payments" given the circumstances surrounding the termina-
tion, the lengthy negotiation of the payments, the size of the payments, and the
ongoing Commission investigation.76 Yuen and Leung appealed the district court
67. rd.
68. Id. at 1036-37.
69. Id. at 1037.
70. Id.; Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1-3 (Oct. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dV179.31x4.d.htm; Press Release, Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., Gemstar Approves
Management Changes (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dV179.31x4.d.htm.
71. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. (Gemstar I), 367 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 384 F.3d 1090
(9th Cir. 2004).
72. Id. at 1089-90.
73. Brief of Henry C. Yuen and Elsie M. Leung, Appellants at 1-2, SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc.,
No. 03-56129 (9th Cir. July 30, 2003).
74. Id. at 34 ("[There was no] evidence adduced that the payments were unduly large as compared to
severance payments paid to similarly situated departing CEOs and CFOs.").
75. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2003), vacated,
384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004). The court summarily rejected Yuen and Leung's constitutional challenge based
on the fact that section 1103 freezes, by their terms, provided for notice and hearing, were limited to short time
periods, and were not punitive because the funds would be returned with interest in the event fraud charges
were not filed within the strict statutory time prescriptions. Id. at *3.
76. See Gemstar I, 367 F.3d at 1092-95.
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order granting the section 1103 freeze to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed and remanded the case for a determination of whether the payments were
extraordinary compared to termination payments made to CEOs and CFOs of
other publicly-held companies."
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit granted the Commission's petition for re-
hearing, and on March 22, 2005, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit issued its
opinion (Gemstar II).8 In Gemstar II, the court affirmed the district court order
granting the Commission's petition to freeze the severance payments under section
1103."9 The court found that the components of the payments should not be con-
sidered in isolation, but rather in the context of the surrounding events and cir-
cumstances."0 The court endorsed a "fact-based and flexible" test to determine
whether payments were "extraordinary payments" under the statute.8 ' The court
enumerated a number of factors as potentially relevant to, but not dispositive of,
the analysis, including: the circumstances under which the payment is made; the
size and purpose of the payment; whether there is a nexus between the suspected
wrongdoing and the payment; and evidence the payment deviated from an "indus-
try standard." 2 In finding the payments at issue in Gemstar II were "extraordinary
payments," the court found significant: the five-month negotiation resulting in the
payments; that the payments were conditioned on the resignation of two top execu-
tives; the apparent nexus between the payments and the alleged financial fraud; and
that the payments were equivalent to five to six times the executives' annual base
salaries.83 In support of its decision, the court also noted that "[section 1103's]
purpose is to temporarily protect corporate funds and the investing public and
creditors against theft, fraud, and dissipation."84
In May 2003, after the termination payments first were frozen, Yuen had filed an
arbitration demand against Gemstar with the American Arbitration Association
alleging that Gemstar breached the termination agreement by withholding the pay-
77. Id at 1095.
78. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. (Gemstar I1), 401 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
79. Id. at 1048.
80. Id. at 1045-47.
81. Id. at 1045.
82. Id. Two Judges concurred in the result, but not the reasoning. The concurring opinion would have
adopted a bright line rule that all termination packages for top executives are by definition "extraordinary
payments" because terminating top executives is not "part of the regular day-to-day business of the company."
See id. at 1048-51 (Rcinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Bea, who wrote the initial Ninth Circuit opinion, which
the court reversed en banc, dissented from the majority opinion. Id. at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea
would have remanded the application to the district court for a determination as to whether the payments were
"extraordinary" in comparison to severance payments made to other top executives of public companies. Id. at
1060. Judge Bea criticized the majority opinion for interpreting "extraordinary payments" as "payments made
under extraordinary circumstances." Id.
83. Id. at 1046.
84. Id. at 1035.
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ments.8" In June 2003, the Commission filed a contested complaint alleging Yuen
and other former Gemstar officers and directors had committed financial fraud.86
On May 8, 2006, the district court of the Central District Court of California issued
a final judgment against Yuen. 7 On June 14, 2007, the arbitration panel issued a
final order, finding that Yuen was in breach of the termination agreement when he
signed it, Gemstar was not obligated to make the termination payments, and Yuen
owed Gemstar various other damages."8 Subsequently, Gemstar filed an action in
New York state court to confirm the arbitration award. 9 Yuen filed a motion to
vacate the arbitration order regarding the payments.9 ° On November 27, 2007, the
New York state court affirmed the arbitration order.9'
On February 15, 2008, Gemstar filed a motion to dissolve the section 1103 or-
der.92 On March 27, 2008, the district court granted Gemstar's motion and dis-
solved the freeze, effectively returning the frozen termination payments to the
company.93
3. Vivendi
The Commission next sought a section 1103 freeze on September 16, 2003, during
its financial fraud investigation of U.S.-listed French media company, Vivendi Uni-
versal, and its former Chairman and CEO, Jean-Marie Messier.94
On July 2, 2002, under intense pressure created by the company's plummeting
stock price, Messier resigned from his position as Chairman and CEO of Vivendi.9"
Prior to resigning, however, Messier negotiated a severance package worth approxi-
mately $23 million.96 Vivendi's new management refused to pay Messier, arguing
that the severance package had not been approved by the Board.97 Consequently,
85. Final Order, In re Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. v. Yuen, No. 602094/07 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 27,
2008).
86. Complaint, SEC v. Yuen, et al., No. CV 03-4376 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2003).
87. See Former Chairman and CEO of Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc. Ordered to Pay Over $22
Million for Role in Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 19,694 (May 10, 2006). Yuen appealed the district
court judgment, which was subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 1, 2008. SEC
v. Yuen, No. 06-55857 (9th Cir. April 1, 2008).
88. Final Order, In re Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. v. Yuen, supra note 85, at *1.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Order Dissolving Section 1103 Escrow, SEC v. Yuen, No. 03-3124 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008).
93. id.
94. SEC Files Sarbanes-Oxley Act Application for Temporary Order Compelling Vivendi Universal, S.A. to
Escrow Extraordinary Payments to its Former CEO Jean-Marie Messier, Litigation Release No. 18352 (Sept. 16,
2003).
95. See Nicola Clark, Vivendi Gets New Boss in Management Shake-up, HERALD TRIB., July 4, 2002, at 1
(Messier's resignation came at the end of "another punishing day for Vivendi's stock, which plunged C 3.90, or
22 percent, to a new low of C 13.90 ($13.70), wiping out a further C4 billion in market value.").
96. See SEC Asks That Vivendi Put Ex-Chiefs Money in Escrow, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at C4.
97. Opinion and Award of Arbitration Tribunal at 7-8, Jean-Marie Messier v. Vivendi Universal, S.A.,
AAA Arbitration No. 3-T-199-00205-94 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n June 27, 2003).
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Messier sought to enforce the agreement, which was governed by New York law and
subject to arbitration." On June 27, 2003, the arbitration panel ruled unanimously
that Vivendi was obligated to pay the $23 million.99 To further complicate matters,
on July 10, 2003, at the request of France's securities market regulator, the Com-
mission des Operations de Bourse, a Paris court froze the severance package pend-
ing approval by Vivendi's shareholders."° Messier filed an action in New York state
court to confirm the arbitration decision.' Vivendi filed a motion to dismiss
Messier's state court petition and to vacate the arbitration award. 2 On September
11, 2003, the New York state court affirmed the arbitration panel's decision for
Messier.10 3
Against this backdrop, the Commission petitioned the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to section 1103, to tempora-
rily freeze the pending twenty-three million dollar severance payment to Messier.0 4
Vivendi did not oppose the Commission's application for a section 1103 freeze. 10 5
On September 24, 2003, the district court granted the Commission's application to
prohibit Vivendi from paying the state court judgment and to require Vivendi to
place the payments into escrow. 6 Messier intervened and filed a motion to vacate
the freeze order. 7 Messier argued that there was nothing extraordinary about his
negotiated severance and that payments due under both a valid arbitration decision
and a valid state law judgment could not be "extraordinary payments."'0 8 The dis-
trict court rejected Messier's arguments."'
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Paris Court Freezes Messier's Severance, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2006, at B6.
101. Order and Judgment Granting Petitioner Jean-Marie Messier's Arbitration Award, Jean-Marie Messier
v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., Case No. 50-T-116-00585-02 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 16, 2003).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. SEC's Application for a Temporary Order Pursuant to Section 1103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
SEC v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., Case No. Ml1-03 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with authors); see also
Applicant Securities and Exchange Commission's Emergency Motion for Entry of a Temporary Order En-
joining Vivendi from Transferring Arbitration Order and Enjoining Enforcement or Collection under Arbitra-
tion Order, SEC v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., Case No. M 1-03 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2003) (on file with authors).
105. Id.
106. Temporary Order Enjoining Vivendi from Transferring Funds in Satisfaction of Arbitration Order and
Enjoining Enforcement or Collection under Arbitration Order, SEC v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., Case No. M11-
03 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003) (on file with authors); SEC Obtains Order Compelling Vivendi Universal, S.A. to
Escrow Payments to Former CEO Jean-Marie Messier, Litigation Release No. 18,373 (Sept. 29, 2003).
107. Memorandum of Law in Support of Jean-Marie Messier's Motion to Vacate or Modify Orders of the
Court Dated September 24, 2003 Enjoining Enforcement of Jean-Marie Messier's New York State Court Judg-
ment Against Vivendi, SEC v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., Case No. Mll-03 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2003) (on file with
authors).
108. Id.
109. Order Granting Motion to Vacate or Modify Orders of the Court Dated September 24, 2003 Enjoining
Enforcement or Collection of Jean-Marie Messier's New York State Court Judgment, SEC v. Vivendi Universal,
S.A., Case No. Mll-03 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2003) (on file with authors).
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Three months later, on December 23, 2003, the Commission filed a settled ac-
tion against Vivendi, Messier, and the company's former CFO, Gullaume Han-
nezo." 5 Pursuant to the final settlement, Messier agreed to pay a $1 million penalty
and to relinquish any claim to the approximately $23 million previously placed in
escrow pursuant to the Commission's section 1103 freeze."' In settlement, Vivendi
paid a fifty million dollar penalty," 2 and Hannezo paid disgorgement and penalties
of approximately $268,000." 3 The penalties and disgorgement paid by Vivendi,
Messier and Hannezo, totaling over $76 million, were placed in a fair fund to be
distributed to investors harmed by the Vivendi fraud." 4
Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) and preliminary injunctions, accompa-
nied by ancillary asset freezes, remain the Commission's most often used method
of securing the status quo and preserving the assets of harmed investors." 5 Never-
theless, the authority to freeze extraordinary payments under section 1103 signifi-
cantly supplements the Commission's ability to act quickly to preserve assets in
unique situations. In HealthSouth, the Commission was able to proactively prevent
a sitting CEO, who was himself subject to Commission investigation for fraud,
from making extraordinary payments to himself or others during the Commis-
sion's investigation. In both Gemstar and Vivendi, the Commission was able to act
quickly to prevent the payment to top executives of tens of millions of dollars in
severance payments, which were negotiated after allegedly fraudulent acts.
B. Bonus and Stock Compensation Clawbacks
In addition to authorizing the prevention of extraordinary payments, SOX gives the
Commission the related authority to require top executives to reimburse issuers for
bonuses and other incentive-based compensation paid based on faulty financial
statements, later restated as a result of misconduct. Section 304, more commonly
known as the "clawback" provision, provides:
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the mate-
rial noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial
reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and
chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for - (1) any
110. SEC Files Settled Civil Fraud Action Against Vivendi Universal, S.A., Its Former CEO, Jean-Marie
Messier, and Its Former CEO, Guillaume, Litigation Release No. 18,523 (Dec. 24, 2003).
111. Id.
112. Id. Vivendi also paid $1 in disgorgement, which enabled its penalty monies to be added to a fair fund
pursuant to section 308 of SOX, 15 U.S.C. § 7246.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007 the Commission sought three extraordinary asset freezes
under section 1103. During the same time period, the Commission sought more than 200 asset freezes. See
SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2003-2007, available at http://www.sec.gov. Traditional asset freezes are
broader powers than § 1103 because they allow the Commission to freeze assets already in the hands of defend-
ants, and not just "extraordinary payments" about to be made. See Gilchrist, supra note 56, at 875-76.
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bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that
person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public
issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial
document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and (2) any profits
realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period."1 6
To date, the Commission has sought to clawback bonuses and stock-based compen-
sation granted by two issuers: Mercury Interactive and UnitedHealth Group.
1. Mercury Interactive
The Commission filed its first section 304 claim on May 31, 2007."17 In this pend-
ing, contested action the Commission is seeking to "clawback" bonuses and stock
compensation, among other relief, relating to options backdating charges filed
against the former CEO, Amnon Landan, and the former CFO, Douglas Smith, of
Mercury Interactive. " 8
The Commission's clawback claims originate from Mercury Interactive's July 3,
2006 restatement of its financial results for fiscal years 2002-2004."9 The restate-
ment reflected that the company failed to disclose more than $258 million in com-
pensation expenses associated with backdated stock options from 2000-2004.121 In
its complaint, the Commission alleges that: Landan and Smith each reviewed and
certified each of the Annual Reports on Form 10-K for fiscal years 2003-2005;
"[b] oth Landan and Smith had ample information at the time they signed the certi-
fications that they were not true";1 2' and both Landan and Smith "obtained signifi-
cant cash bonuses ... at least in part related to the financial performance of the
company during the period of the fraud, which resulted in material GAAP expenses
being omitted from the company's financial reports."'2 2 The Commission's com-
plaint against Landan and Smith seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement, penalties,
officer and director bars, and reimbursement of bonuses and profits from stock
sales pursuant to section 304.23
116. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(l)-(2) (2006).
117. Complaint, SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-CV-02822, at 1 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2007).
118. Id. 55 145-89. Mercury Interactive, which was acquired by Hewlett-Packard Company after the alleged
misconduct, settled related charges with the Commission. In settlement, the company paid a twenty-eight
million dollar civil penalty and agreed to be permanently enjoined from further violations of the securities
laws. Press Release, SEC, SEC Settles With Mercury Interactive and Sues Former Mercury Officers for Stock
Option Backdating and Other Fraudulent Conduct, SEC Release No. 2007-108 (May 31, 2007). The Commis-
sion's contested action against the four former officers is pending. Id.
119. Complaint, SEC v. Mercury Interactive, supra note 117, 5 101.
120. Id.
121. Id. 104.
122. Id. 1 81.
123. Id. at Prayer for Relief, 51 I-V.
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On October 1, 2007, Defendant Smith filed a motion to dismiss the section 304
claims, among others. 24 The Commission filed its opposition to Smith's motion to
dismiss on December 3, 2007,12' and Smith filed a reply on January 15, 2008.126
Smith makes two substantive arguments that the section 304 claims should be
dismissed.
First, Smith argues that the Commission's claim of forfeiture of bonuses and
profits pursuant to section 304 amounts to an improper retroactive application of
SOX, because the alleged options backdating misconduct, which ultimately resulted
in the restatements at issue, all predated enactment of SOX.,2 7 In response, the
Commission argues that while misconduct is a necessary element of section 304, it
was the filing of the materially noncompliant financial statements, and not the
underlying misconduct itself, that triggered the restatement and consequent repay-
ment obligation under section 304.2' Each of the later-restated financial statements
that the Commission cites as a basis for its section 304 claims was filed after the
effective date of section 304.29 In further support of its argument that it is the filing
date of the later-restated financials and not the date of the underlying misconduct
that is determinant of the statute's applicability, the Commission notes that "by the
language of Section 304, neither the CFO nor CEO need be personally responsible
for, or even aware of, the misconduct itself.' 130
Smith's second argument is that section 304 only mandates repayment of bo-
nuses and other compensation received "during the 12-month period following the
first public issuance or filing with the Commission" and that none of the later-re-
stated filings alleged by the Commission as bases for its section 304 claims is a "first
124. Defendant Douglas Smith's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P.
12(B)(6) and 9(B) or, in the Alternative, to Strike Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(F) at 4-9, SEC v. Mercury Interac-
tive LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with authors). Defendant Landon moved to
dismiss a number of the Commission's other charges, but did not address the Commission's section 304 claims.
125. Plaintiffs Opposition to Landan's, Abram's, Smith's and Skaer's Motion to Dismiss at 10-14, SEC v.
Mercury Interactive LLC, et al., No. 5:07-cv-02822 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007) (on file with authors).
126. Defendant Douglas Smith's Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of His Motion
to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(B)(6) and 9(B) or, in the Alternative, to Strike Pursuant to
F.R.C. P. 12(F) at 2-6, SEC. v. Mercury Interactive LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008) (on file
with authors).
127. Id. at 2-5.
128. Plaintiffs Opposition to Landan's, Abram's, Smith's and Skaer's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 125, at
11.
129. Id. at 12.
130. Id. Senate amendment 4198, proposed by then-Senator Max Cleland, would have limited the clawback
provision to officers and directors "with knowledge, at the time of the misconduct, of the material noncompli-
ance of the issuer." See Arnold & Porter Legislative History: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745, History 40-C, 2002 WL 32054475. Similarly an earlier version of section 304 proposed in the House would
have limited executive bonus and stock compensation disgorgement provisions to instances in which the Com-
mission can "prove misconduct" by the specific officers or directors subject to the clawbacks. See H.R. 3763,
107th Cong. § 12 (2002); H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 44 (2002). Notably, no knowledge or actual misconduct
requirement is found in the final version of section 304 and the clawback provision applies only to the CEO
and CFO, who are required to certify the accuracy of the financial statements.
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public issuance or filing.".... The Commission's claim against Smith relies on his
review and certification of "eleven Mercury quarterly reports filed with the Com-
mission between November 12, 2002 and May 6, 2005," and Mercury's annual re-
ports for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005.132 Smith argues that because the
Commission does not allege any backdating occurred after April 1, 2002, the first
public issuance orfiling in which the company failed to expense its backdated option
grants was Mercury's August 13, 2002 Form 10-Q.'" In response, the Commission
argues that each of the Commission filings during the vesting period of the
backdated options constitutes a first filing of materially noncompliant financial in-
formation because GAAP requires any in-the-money portion of an option to be
expensed over the vesting period of the option.'34 A hearing on Smith's motion to
dismiss is scheduled for April 25, 2008.
2. UnitedHealth Group
The Commission next used its section 304 clawback authority on December 6,
2007, when it filed a settled options backdating action against William McGuire,
the former CEO and Chairman of the Board of UnitedHealth Group. 35 In addition
to paying disgorgement and a seven million dollar penalty, pursuant to section 304,
McGuire agreed to reimburse UnitedHealth for approximately $448 million that he
received from 2003 through 2006 in cash bonuses, and profits from the exercise and
sale of UnitedHealth stock and unexercised UnitedHealth options.' 36 The Commis-
sion's clawback claims against McGuire originate from UnitedHealth Group's
March 6, 2007 restatement, which disclosed that the company materially under-
stated its stock-based compensation expenses each year from 1994 through 2005,
resulting in a cumulative misstatement of over $1.5 billion.'37 Notably, the Com-
mission's settled action was filed only nine months after the restatement that trig-
gered the section 304 claim.
In both Mercury Interactive and UnitedHealth Group, the Commission used its
section 304 authority to seek clawbacks of bonuses and equity-based compensation
of executives who were alleged either to have been active in, or to have had contem-
131. Defendant Douglas Smith's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P.
12(B)(6) and 9(B) or, in the Alternative, to Strike Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(F), supra note 124, at 8-9.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 8-9.
134. Plaintiff's Opposition to Landan's, Abram's, Smith's and Skaer's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 125, at
13.
135. Press Release, SEC, Former UnitedHealth Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating
Case for $468 Million, SEC Release 2007-255 (Dec. 6, 2007).
136. Former UnitedHealth Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating Case for $468 Million,
Litigation Release No. 20,387 (Dec. 6, 2007).
137. Id.
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poraneous knowledge of, the misconduct leading to the relevant restatements.'
The outcome of the pending action against the former certifying executives of Mer-
cury Interactive may help shape how the Commission chooses to use section 304 in
the future. UnitedHealth Group demonstrates the utility of section 304 in provid-
ing a clear, disciplined basis for calculating disgorgement in order to resolve liabil-
ity claims quickly.
Significantly, private industry appears to be following both Congress' and the
Commission's lead, and many Boards independently have chosen to put clawback
provisions in their executive employment agreements.139 According to one 2007
study that looked at proxies filed by fifty of the 100 largest companies in the United
States, 44% had clawback provisions in their executive employee contracts. 40
C. Fair Funds
One of the most frequently used tools granted to the Commission in SOX is the
ability to create "Fair Funds," which allow the Commission to add civil penalties
collected in enforcement actions to disgorgement funds and distribute the funds to
harmed investors.' The practice of returning disgorged funds is not new.142 How-
ever, prior to SOX, all collected civil penalties were required by law to be sent to the
U.S. Treasury.
Since the Commission received Fair Funds authority, it has ordered over $9 bil-
lion in penalties and disgorgement to be placed into Fair Funds for distribution to
harmed investors. More than $3.5 billion of those funds already have been distrib-
uted. 43 In February 2008, the Commission created a new Office of Collections and
Distributions to expedite distribution of funds to harmed investors.' 4
D. CEO & CFO Certifications
The scandals leading up to SOX focused public attention on personal accountabil-
ity at the top of the corporate ladder. Congress addressed this concern in section
138. Although to date the Commission has not sought to clawback bonuses and other compensation under
section 304 in instances in which the CEO or CFO have no knowledge or participation in the underlying
misconduct, Congress did not so limit section 304. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
139. Gretchen Morgenson, Making Managers Pay, Literally, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, § 3, at 1.
140. Id. (citing study by California-based executive compensation research firm Equilar).
141. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006).
142. One notable example is the Commission's investigation and settlement in October 1993 of fraud
charges against Prudential Securities, following which the Commission distributed a record $900 million to
individuals harmed by the purchase of limited partnership interests. See SEC v. Prudential Securities Incorpo-
rated, Litigation Release No. 13,840, 53 SEC Docket 709 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993); David Barboza, 30 Firms to Pay
$900 Million in Investor Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1997, at Al.
143. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Remarks to the 'SEC Speaks in 2008' Program of the Practicing Law
Institute (Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spchO20808cc.htm.
144. Press Release, SEC, SEC Chairman Cox Announces Creation of New Office, Appointment of Leaders,
to Expedite Distribution of Billions to Injured Investors, SEC Release No. 2008-12 (Feb. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-12.htm.
VOL. 3 NO. 2 2008
SARBANES-OXLEY TURNS SIX
302, which requires both the CEO and CFO to certify that the company's quarterly
financial statements are complete and accurate and that internal accounting con-
trols are effective' 45
"Certification" of financials by top executives is not new. Principal executive of-
ficers were required to sign company Annual Reports and Form 10-Ks and could be
liable for civil or criminal penalties for malfeasance before SOX.'46 However, the
specificity of SOX and its new focus on personal accountability are new. SOX re-
quires CEOs and CFOs of public companies to certify that: (1) they have reviewed
the financial report; (2) based on their knowledge, the report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or any material omissions; (3) based on their
knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included in the
report fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of the issuer; and (4) they are aware of their responsibility for, and have
taken certain actions and made certain disclosures with respect to, the issuer's in-
ternal controls.' 47
Now in their sixth year, the certification provisions largely have been accepted. 4 '
Since the enactment of SOX, the Commission has brought more than fifty enforce-
ment actions involving CEO or CFO certifications, including the options backdat-
ing actions against former Brocade Communications CEO, President and
Chairman, Gregory Reyes, former Comverse Chairman and CEO, Jacob "Kobi" Al-
145. Sarbanes-Oxley § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
146. Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and Guides; Integration of
Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Securities Act Release No. 6,231, Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, AS-279
(Sept. 25, 1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 231, 239, 240, 241 and 249) (explaining that the form 10-K
must be signed on behalf of the issuer by the registrant's principal executive officer or officers, its principal
financial officer, its controller or principal accounting officer, and by at least a majority of the board of direc-
tors or persons performing similar functions). On June 27, 2002, the Commission issued an Order requiring
CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies with annual revenues of more than $1.2 billon to file sworn
statements attesting to the accuracy, to the best of their knowledge, of certain of the companies' filings, or
alternatively requiring the executives to file a sworn statement describing the facts and circumstances that
would make a certification of the filings incorrect. Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to
Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC File No. 4-460, OMB No. 3235-0569 (June 27,
2002).
147. Sarbanes-Oxley § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241. SOX also provides significantly enhanced criminal penalties
for officers who violate the section 302 certification requirements. CEOs and CFOs who certify statements
knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with the requirements of
section 302 are subject to fines of up to $1 million and up to 10 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1). CEOs
and CFOs who willfully certify statements knowing that the periodic reports accompanying the statements fail
to comply with section 302 are subject to fines of up to $5 million and up to twenty years in prison. Id.
§ 1350(c)(2).
148. Some early critics argued that the certification requirements of SOX would require new and unreason-
able commitments of time and money and that the new attention on potential personal liability might cause
good candidates to shy away from officer positions. See Peter J. Wallison, Blame Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 3, 2003, at A16 (arguing SOX may lead to increased risk-aversion amongst corporate managers and
directors).
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exander, and former Comverse CFO, David Kreinberg.'49 Notably, these are the
same type of fraudulent certification cases against corporate officers that the Com-
mission brought before the Act. The Commission has not sued any officer under
the new certification provisions where there was no indication the executive had, or
was reckless in not having, some knowledge that the certified financials were mate-
rially incorrect. While the new certifications may not have radically altered the legal
requirement that top executives take responsibility for the company's filings, the
new provisions make it more difficult for corporate officers to plead ignorance as a
defense. Moreover, section 302 gives the Commission an added tool in framing its
charges, settlements and prayers for relief.
E. Enhanced Remedies
In addition to providing new enforcement charging tools, SOX enhances the reme-
dies available in Commission actions. Most significantly, SOX increases the Com-
mission's authority to bar securities law violators from serving as officers or
directors of public companies. Prior to SOX, the Commission had to file an injunc-
tive action in federal court to obtain an officer and director bar.'50 The Commis-
sion had to prove that the individual's conduct demonstrated "substantial
unfitness" to serve as an officer and director of a public company.'' SOX amended
this authority in two ways.
First, section 1105 gives the Commission authority to request officer and direc-
tor bars in administrative cease-and-desist proceedings without petitioning a fed-
eral court.'52 Second, section 305 of the Act reduces the standard for obtaining an
officer and director bar from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness."'53 Prior to SOX,
most federal courts employed a six-prong test, articulated by the Second Circuit in
SEC v. Patel,5 4 to determine whether the Commission had demonstrated "substan-
tial unfitness."' In Patel, the defendant was a first-time securities law offender. 56
The district court summarily concluded that the defendant was likely to commit
additional violations if not barred because he abused his position as an officer and
149. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Comverse Technology, Inc. CEO, CFO, and General
Counsel in Stock Option Backdating Scheme, SEC Release No. 2006-137 (Aug. 9, 2006); Press Release, SEC,
U.S. Attorney's Office and SEC Separately Charge Former Brocade CEO and Vice President in Stock Option
Backdating Scheme, SEC Release No. 2006-121 (July 20, 2006).
150. See Securities Act § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e); Exchange Act § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2). For a
detailed discussion of the history of the Commission's authority to seek officer and director bars and its related
practice thereof, see Philip F.S. Berg, Unfit to Serve: Permanently Barring People From Serving as Officers and
Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1871 (2003).
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2000).
152. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-3 (2006).
153. Id. § 305, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2).
154. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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director." 7 The Second Circuit reversed the district court bar and remanded for
further consideration of whether there was a likelihood of future violations if the
defendant was not barred.' 8 In reaching its holding, the appellate court considered
the following six factors: (1) the egregiousness of the underlying securities law vio-
lation; (2) the defendant's repeat offender status; (3) the defendant's role or posi-
tion when he or she engaged in the fraud; (4) the defendant's degree of scienter, (5)
the defendant's economic stake in the violation; and (6) the likelihood that the
misconduct will recur.'59 In reversing the bar order, the appellate court noted that
although past violations were "not essential" to establish "substantial unfitness" to
serve as an officer or director, in the absence of past violations the court must
articulate a factual basis for concluding there is a likelihood of repeat violations in
order to sustain an officer and director bar.'"
The reduction of the Commission's burden of proof from "substantially unfit" to"unfit" was first addressed by a federal court in May 2007, in SEC v. Levine.'16 In
Levine, the Commission brought fraud charges against Gerald and Marie Levine, a
husband and wife team who orchestrated a complex scheme using multiple entities
to defraud investors. 62 The Levines were first-time securities law violators. 63 In its
petition for relief, the Commission sought officer and director bars against the
Levines based upon their "unfitness" to serve in such capacity.' 1" The district court
began its analysis by noting that the legislative history makes clear that in changing
the standard from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness," Congress intended to re-
duce the government's burden to obtain an officer and director bar. 65 The court
ultimately adopted a "holistic" approach that takes into account a non-exhaustive
list of nine factors proposed by Professor Jayne Barnard. 166 Applying this more flex-
ible approach, the Levine court found that the Commission had met its burden of
showing the first-time offenders were "unfit" to serve as officers or directors be-
cause, among other reasons, the defendants were the "driving or organizing force
157. Id.
158. Id. at 142
159. Id. at 141.
160. Id.
161. 517 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2007).
162. Id. at 146.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 142.
165. Id. at 144.
166. Id. at 146. Specifically, the court found that the following, non-exhaustive list of factors should be
considered: (1) the nature and complexity of the scheme; (2) the defendant's role in the scheme; (3) the use of
corporate resources in executing the scheme; (4) the defendant's financial gain (or loss avoidance) from the
scheme; (5) the loss to investors and others as a result of the scheme; (6) whether the scheme represents an
isolated occurrence or a pattern of misconduct; (7) the defendant's use of stealth and concealment; (8) the
defendant's history of business and related misconduct; and (9) the defendant's acknowledgment of wrongdo-
ing and the credibility of his contrition. Id. at 145 (citing Jayne W. Barnard, Rule lob-5 and the "Unfitness"
Question, 47 AMIZ. L. REV. 9, 46 (2005)).
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or 'kingpin"' behind the fraud, and the magnitude of the fraud's impact was
substantial. 67
In addition to the specific new remedies discussed above, SOX expressly autho-
rizes the Commission to request, and federal courts to grant, "any equitable relief
that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors." 6
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens the reporting requirements for public compa-
nies and increases the accountability of top executives, auditors, and internal com-
pliance professionals. In addition, SOX provides the Commission with significant
new enforcement tools, including both new causes of action and new remedies. The
most significant of these new enforcement tools are extraordinary payment freezes,
clawbacks of executive compensation, fair funds, executive certifications of financial
statements, and enhanced remedies. To date, the Commission has utilized ex-
traordinary payment freezes and clawbacks sparingly, relying more commonly on
its pre-SOX injunctive, TRO and disgorgement authorities to require charged exec-
utives to pay back excessive compensation and bonuses. While not the norm, ex-
traordinary payment freezes and clawbacks substantially increase the Commission's
flexibility to proceed quickly and efficiently in enforcement matters. Fair funds,
executive certification, and enhanced remedy cases now are common. Conse-
quently, the Commission is returning more money to more harmed investors, and
executives are more cognizant than ever that they are accountable for the public
statements and filings that they make.
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